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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a mom in Anywhere, America and this is your
child's first day of kindergarten. This is one of those days where most
parents beam with pride. You think your little one is so special, just
like all good parents. Alas, it is a big day and you have spared no ex-
pense-his shoes are polished, his hair is combed just right, and his
dress shirt is tucked in-the works. As you pack his bags, however,
you pause for a moment to note that your road to this day was very
atypical from most parents. 2 The reason for this is that your child is
1. Chad Hinson is a third year J.D. Candidate, Florida A&M University College of
Law. I would like to thank Prof. Barbara Bernier for her guidance and support. For Carter:
A boy of sweet promise.
2. This hypothetical is from the author's personal experience of being a parent of a
four year old child with Autism Spectrum Disorder in Orlando, Florida. The author is also a
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diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). 3 As you zip his bag
shut, you glance down into his eyes as they gaze upon you with the raw
innocence of youth. The gleam of his eyes illuminates that of a child
not yet tainted by the ills of our society. His peering gaze does, how-
ever, indicate that something to him seems out of the ordinary. You
try assuring him with an uneasy wink of confidence, but as you head
for the door, suddenly doubt crosses your own mind. You wonder if
they will teach him, if they will hold him, and if they will advocate for
him. You know your child has worth, yet you worry that he will be
defined by his limitations rather than be challenged to achieve his po-
tential. As you open the door to your car, you remember your own days
of public school education. You fondly recall the riveting speeches of
Dr. Martin Luther King, the magical and mysterious wonders of na-
ture, and the ingenious and dark poetry of Edgar Allen Poe. You want
your child to be exposed to the same opportunity you had in school.
You know his potential is there, but will they tap into it? After all,
Albert Einstein and Sir Isaac Newton were autistic.4
As you walk into his classroom, you glance over at the chalk-
board. You sit your child down abruptly and look carefully to make
sure you gather the information correctly. To your disbelief, up on the
board in big, bold letters are written the following words: "The Su-
preme Court, in the decision of Board of Education v. Rowley, 6 has
stated that because your child is handicapped, our school 'doesn't have
to provide him with an opportunity to achieve his full potential com-
mensurate with the opportunity provided other children." 6 You
inadvertently drop your pencil to the floor as you quietly sigh. Your
child was born with two strikes against him and now he has a third:
the failing public school system and the Supreme Court that sanctions
them. You know your child faces obstacles and challenges most people
cannot fathom, yet you believe your child deserves the basic educa-
tional opportunity other children are afforded. He deserves an
former public school educator of six years that taught many children who were impacted by
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (2000).
3. See generally DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed.
2000), at 1, 5 (defining Autism as a brain development disorder characterized by impaired
social interaction and communication, and by restricted and repetitive behavior. These
signs all begin before a child is three years old. Autism affects many parts of the brain; how
this occurs is not understood. The Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) also include the
related conditions Asperger syndrome and PDD-NOS, which have fewer signs and
symptoms).
4. See BBC News, Einstein and Newton 'had autism', http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
health/2988647.stm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
5. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S.176 (1982).
6. Id. at 205.
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education with meaning, even if the outcomes are uncertain. As you
clench his tender hand, you remember the beautiful and eloquent
words uttered long ago by Judge John Minor Wisdom in his opinion in
Meredith v. Fair.7 Judge Wisdom was a progressive and good man who
was caught in the vortex of one of the most fiercely contested 1960's
civil rights education cases in Mississippi.8 Judge Wisdom knew that
good law could only be justified by the impact on the interests of all
people. As he rendered the opinion of the court long ago, he boldly
broke ranks with many of his colleagues when he uttered these pro-
phetic words too often forgotten in courts across America today:
A man should be able to find an education by taking the broad high-
way. He should not have to take by-roads through the woods and
follow winding trails through sharp thickets, in constant tension
because of pitfalls and traps, and, after years of effort, perhaps at-
tain the threshold of his goal when he is past caring about it.9
As you get up to leave the classroom, you realize that the "semi-
nal" case of Rowley was written as the law of the sword rather than as
one of the shield. History has witnessed our highest court erroneously
swap the shield for sword several times in its imperfect history.10 In
2010, many public classrooms for children with Autism Spectrum Dis-
order are anything but appropriate and far from meaningful. This
reality is patently unacceptable and at odds with the polestar function
of public education in providing a meaningful education to all stu-
dents." This paper will examine the case of Board of Education v.
Rowley and make several arguments. The first argument analyzes the
seismic demographic shift of children with ASD in our classrooms to-
day and its unforeseeability to the majority of Justices who issued the
opinion in Rowley, thus calling for new authority so the courts can rec-
oncile the illogical standard of applying antiquated authority to
7. See MEREDITH V. FAIR, 298 F.2d 696 (2nd Cir.1962) (recognizing that the road to an
education should not be fraught with perilous difficulties based on one's race).
8. See generally Joel W. Friedman, Desegregating the South: John Minor Wisdom's
Role in Enforcing Brown's Mandate, 78 TULANE L. REv. 6 (2004).
9. Meredith, 298 F.2d at 703.
10. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (ruling that people of African
descent imported into the United States and held as slaves, or their descendents were not
legal persons). See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the
constitutionality of racial segregation even in public accommodations under the doctrine of
"separate but equal." Id. at 552 (Harlan, J, dissenting)).
11. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE, OR ON EDUCATION (Allan Bloom trans.,
New York: Basic Books 1979) (1762) (describing the importance of education to every
individual). See generally MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN ET AL., EDUCATION LAw, POLICY &
PRACTICE, CASES & MATERIALS (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2004) (analyzing the
different educational theories of various philosophers).
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contemporary autism cases. This premise is a derivative of the logical
notion that as the rise of autism progresses in America, there are and
will be new societal interests in seeing these children attain a mean-
ingful education commensurate with their non-disabled peers. The
slow judicial osmosis of the Supreme Court is currently mired in an
erroneous judicial ideology that myopically clings to antiquated prece-
dent when unorthodox social circumstances mandate change.
President Barack Obama and the United States Congress now recog-
nize the fierce urgency of modernizing and tailoring federal laws to
combat Autism Spectrum Disorder.12 Initiatives by President Obama,
along with proposed congressional legislation, show unity and alli-
ance. 13 As a result of stubborn judicial adherence to poor precedent,
many parents of children with ASD are fraught with uncertainty and
anxiety when they seek legitimate redress from our courts.
The second argument scrutinizes the lack of consensus by the
Supreme Court Justices regarding the legislative intent and history of
the Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA)14 on
which the foundation of Rowley was written. The fierce disagreement
and split among the Justices calls for a renewed examination of the
majority's rationale. The underlying position of this note is that the
majority's opinion was erroneous as a matter of law. Moreover, be-
cause the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)15 has
replaced the EAHCA, it is time for a fresh judicial approach that ap-
plies a common sense rule to progressive times.
The final argument is that blanket application of Rowley cre-
ates the unusual judicial paradox of shielding our schools, rather than
the children that Congress intended to protect.16 Presently, under the
holding of Rowley, public schools have no quantifiable measure or cred-
ible threshold by which they are held accountable. This results in
deleterious long term outcomes for these children who clearly need
more than empty formalities and procedural "safeguards." While there
is an important duty to safeguard public schools from frivolous law-
suits, schools that fail autistic children should not be granted carte
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175
(1970), was reauthorized as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA), Pub L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975); EAHCA was reauthorized as the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103
(1990); IDEA was reauthorized as IDEIA, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§1400-85 (Supp. 2005)).
15. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (Supp. 2005).
16. See S. Rep. No. 94-168, p 5 (1975) (S. Rep.); H.R. Rep., at 2-3. (1975).
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blanche exemption from viable actions. Accordingly, this note con-
cludes with an examination of a modern case Thompson R2-J v.
Luke 7 , which demonstrates the harsh result of applying a nonsensical
holding to an unprecedented social epidemic.
II. RE-EXAMINING ROWLEY
A. Classroom Disability Precedent
Ten year old Amy Rowley was deaf, so she couldn't hear the
words uttered by Justice William Rehnquist on June 18th, 1982 as he
delivered the opinion of the court."' Amy was a first grade student at
the Furnace Woods School in the Hendrick Hudson School District lo-
cated in Peekskill, New York.' 9 The issue before the Supreme Court
was a dispute over the statutory construction and legislative intent be-
hind the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA). 20 The initial dispute arose because the parents of Amy
Rowley requested that the school district place a qualified sign-lan-
guage interpreter in all her academic classes in lieu of assistance
proposed in other parts of her Individualized Educational program
(IEP).2 1 When their request was denied, the Rowleys demanded and
received a hearing before an independent examiner. 22 The examiner
agreed with the administrator's determination that an interpreter was
not necessary because "Amy was achieving educationally, academi-
cally, and socially without assistance."23 Pursuant to the Act's
provision for judicial review, the Rowley family then brought forth an
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, claiming that the administrator's denial of a sign-language
interpreter constituted denial of a "free appropriate public education"
(FAPE) to Amy guaranteed under the Act. 2 4 The District Court de-
scribed Amy as "a remarkably well adjusted child," who "understands
considerably less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not
deaf."25 Consequently, Judge Vincent Broderick and the Second Cir-
cuit concluded Amy was not receiving a free appropriate public
17. Thompson R2J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 2007 WL 1879981 (D. Colo. June 27, 2007).
18. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
19. Id. at 184.
20. Id. at 179.
21. Id. at 184.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(2) (1975).
25. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. 528, 531 (1980).
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education. 26 The U.S. District Court for the Second Circuit, for the
first time, defined a FAPE as "an opportunity to achieve potential com-
mensurate with the opportunity provided other children."27
After the School Board of Hendrick Hudson School District ap-
pealed, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the
U.S. District Court's broad statutory interpretation over what defines
"free and appropriate public education."28 Furthermore, because the
Court of Appeals held that its findings were not clearly erroneous, a
divided panel of judges subsequently affirmed. 29 This set the stage for
a final determination of what Congress intended by the words "free
and appropriate" within the context of the EACHA. Because of the
cryptic nature of "free and appropriate", the U.S. Supreme Court
granted the Hendrick Hudson School District's writ of certiorari. 30 The
parents of Amy Rowley had an enhanced interest in the outcome be-
cause both parents, Clifford and Nancy, were also deaf.3 1
When the opinion came down a little over two months later, the
United States Supreme Court in a majority opinion reversed the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 32 The majority
in its opinion rejected the U.S. District Court's definition of "free and
appropriate" by looking to a fiercely disputed legislative intent behind
the EAHCA.33 First, the Supreme Court rejected the U.S. District
Court's holding that the Act itself did not define a "free and appropri-
ate education."34 Justice Rehnquist stated that it did expressly define
"free and appropriate" by using the following criteria: (a) provided at
public expense, under public supervision and without charge; (b) meet-
ing the standards of the State Educational Agency; (c) including an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in
the state involved; (d) provided in conformity with the individualized
education program (IEP) required under section 1414 (a)(5) of this ti-
tle.35 Additionally, the majority then stated that special education was
required to assist a handicapped child to "benefit" from special instruc-
26. Id. at 529.
27. Id. at 534.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
31. http://www.listen-up.org/hbooks/rights.htm
32. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 210.
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1975).
34. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 187-204.
35. A child is normally eligible for an IEP when the child's educational progress is
adversely affected by his or her disability such that special services or accommodations are
needed. See 20 U.S.C. H§ 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i).
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tion.3 6 Thus, the court held if personalized instruction is being
provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to "ben-
efit" from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional
checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a FAPE as defined by the
Act.37
However, the majority noted that Congress found in writing
this Act that of the roughly eight million handicapped children in the
United States, one million were excluded entirely from the public
school system and more than half were receiving an inappropriate edu-
cation. 38 They then stated that the face of the statute evinces a
Congressional intent to bring previously excluded handicapped chil-
dren into public education systems of the United States and to require
the states to adopt procedures which would result in individualized
consideration of and instruction for each child.39 Further clarifying
their position, Justice Rehnquist added that by passing the Act, Con-
gress sought primarily to make public education available to
handicapped children, but did not require that the States maximize the
potential of handicapped children commensurate with the opportunity
provided other children.40
The majority concluded by stating that the EAHCA itself
merely provided disabled children a "basic floor of opportunity" by way
of access to specialized instruction.4 1 Because neither the U.S. District
Court nor the Court of Appeals found that the petitioners had failed to
comply with the procedural requirements of Title 20 U.S.C. § 1415,
they erroneously concluded that the Act required the necessity of a
sign language interpreter for Amy Rowley. 42 On that basis, the Su-
preme Court reversed the decision.
B. Oral Argument and Legislative Intent
The Supreme Court reached its conclusion largely based on tes-
timony presented by Amy Rowley's parents and the Hendrick Hudson
Central School District.43 The issue before the court was couched dif-
ferently between counsel for the petitioner, Board of Education of the
36. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
37. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
38. Id. at 191.
39. Id. at 192.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). at 191.
43. See generally Rowley.
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Hendrick Hudson Central School District, and respondent, Amy
Rowley and her parents Clifford and Nancy Rowley.44 Mr. Kuntz, ap-
pearing on behalf of the petitioners phrased the issue as whether or
not:
"[T]he Hendrick Hudson Central School District [met] the require-
ments of Public law 94-142, the Education of All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, when it provided Amy Rowley with an educa-
tional program which resulted in outstanding academic
achievement and social success, although it did not comply with her
parent's wishes that a sign language interpreter be placed in her
classroom."45
Mr. Chatoff, counsel for respondent, however, phrased the issue
differently:
"[Whether or not a] school district that receives funds under the
Education for All Handicapped Children's Act upon, its commit-
ment to provide each handicapped child with a free appropriate
public education fulfilled that obligation when it fails to provide a
specific deaf child with the services necessary for that child to re-
ceive an educational opportunity equivalent to the educational
opportunity provided to other children."46
Additionally, Attorney Schulder was present on behalf of the United
States to rebut the petitioner's contentions that raised fundamental
questions about Congress' purpose and intent in enacting the
EAHCA. 47
A poignant question offered by the court that shed some light on
which direction it was moving was addressed to Mr. Kuntz, attorney
for petitioner, when one of the Justices asked, "as soon as you acknowl-
edge that there are some substantive requirements, what's the
stopping point?"48 Mr. Kuntz agreed with the Justices concerns and
stated, "once you grant one case, then every other case follows it, and
it's only a question of degree. . .. . .. that's what happens when you
carry the logic to its extreme."49 Subsequently, Mr. Kuntz opined that
"there are substantive rights insofar as a right to the procedure is con-
cerned, but . .. that's the only right of substance that was enacted by
the statute."5 0 Essentially, Mr. Kuntz's argument was that 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415 contained no actual substantive rights for disabled children,
44. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (No. 80-1002).
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id. at 32.
48. Id. at 17..
49. Id. at 17.
50. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (No. 80-1002).
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merely de minimus procedural "safeguards." After he completed his
argument, attorney for respondent, Mr. Chatoff, began.
According to one of the Justices, The language of the Act and
the regulations appear to require no more than an individual educa-
tional program in accordance with the state plan." Hence, when Mr.
Chatoff was questioned with regard to "what in the Act itself or the
accompanying regulations would yield the precise test that the Court
of Appeals applied, the measurement of the potential and determining
the shortfall and applying that standard,"5 1 Mr. Chatoff supported his
position as follows:
The Act requires specific individualized instruction for each handi-
capped child. The equal educational opportunity standard is set
forth in the Senate report and in the Congressional debate accom-
panying the Act. I think that that should be responsive to your
question. I would only add that if Amy receives the proper educa-
tion she can become a doctor, a lawyer, an engineer. 52
The Rowley's argument was predicated on the position that Ti-
tle 20 U.S.C. § 1415 provided for more than meager procedural
"safeguards." They believed that the legislative intent found within
congressional reports provided ample evidence of broader substantive
rights. Furthermore, they argued, the EAHCA was intended to have
the force of giving disabled children equality of opportunity in public
classrooms commensurate with that of their non disabled peers.5 3
After petitioner and respondent concluded, the last attorney to
speak was Mr. Schulder, attorney for the United States. When asked
"[h]ow one gets from there to the standard that the District Court used
and that the Court of Appeals was willing to see used. . ..that each
handicapped child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children,"54 Mr.
Schulder stated, "Your Honor, we do not agree with that particular
part of the District Court's opinion."55
The final step the Supreme Court utilized in reaching its opin-
ion in Rowley was to look at the legislative history and intent behind
the Education for All Children Handicapped Act of 1975. Two pieces of
evidence cast some doubt on the majority opinion's overall rationale.
The first statement is found in one Senate report that specifically
shows that Congress intended to "take a more active role under its re-
51. Id. at 30-31.
52. Id. at 30-31.
53. Id. at 32-33.
54. Id. at 32-33.
55. Id.
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sponsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that
handicapped children are provided an equal educational opportu-
nity."5 6 Moreover, the majority themselves conceded this very point
when they stated that "Congress in 1974 greatly increased federal
funding for education of the handicapped and for the first time re-
quired recipient States to adopt 'a goal of providing full educational
opportunities to all handicapped children."'5 7
Insight into the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, as well
as the dissenting opinions of Justices White, Brennan and Marshall,
raise further questions. Justice Blackmun, while concurring in the
overall holding, utterly rejected how the majority interpreted the legis-
lative intent.58 In fact, his overall analysis was in total agreement
with the dissenting opinion:
The clarity of the legislative intent convinces me that the relevant
question here is not, as the court says, whether Amy Rowley's Indi-
vidualized Education Program was 'reasonably calculated' to enable
her to receive educational benefits, rather, the question is whether
Amy's program, viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity to
understand and participate in the classroom that was substantially
equal to that given her non-handicapped classmates. This is a stan-
dard predicated on equal educational opportunity and equal access
to the educational process.5 9
Justice Blackmun's concurrence with the majority was pre-
mised mainly on the fact that Amy was making very good progress in
the classroom. Citing to the record, he specifically pointed to the initial
opinion of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District's impartial
hearing officer who felt Amy was doing well in school.6 0
The dissenting opinion also vehemently refuted the majority by
analyzing the legislative intent. 61 Justice White's dissent lambasted
the majority opinion by stating that "the Act itself announces that it
provides a 'full educational opportunity to all handicapped children." 62
For further support, the dissent cited Senator Stafford, one of the origi-
nal sponsors of the Act, who unequivocally declared in congressional
hearings that "[w]e can all agree that the education given a handi-
capped child should be equivalent, at least, to the one those children
56. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975).
57. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 (1982).
58. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 210. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 210-211.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 212-218. (White, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
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who are not handicapped receive."63 Finally, the dissent took excep-
tion to the majority's interpretation of the word "appropriate."6 4
Justice White stated that the "meaning of appropriate was to approxi-
mate the opportunity provided other children as noted again and again
in the legislative history."65
III. THE PRECIPITANT RISE OF AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER
Today about thirteen percent of all students qualify as disabled
in public classrooms. 66 The average thirty-student classroom will have
at least three children with disabilities.6 7 The number of children with
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) receiving treatment in public schools
has soared by six hundred percent.68 During the initial creation of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, around 1.75 million chil-
dren were excluded and another 2.2 million languished in classrooms
without help or curriculum adapted to their needs.69 The pediatric
prevalence rate of ASD in 2010 is calculated to be one in every one
hundred ten children born today.70 Boys are afflicted at four times the
rate than girls and their diagnosis rate is closer to one in ninety nine.71
Every ethnic and socioeconomic demographic is affected. 72 There is no
known cure as the incidence rates continue to skyrocket.73 As the rise
of autism continues to escalate and more and more children are labeled
"disabled", the legal community remains skeptical as to whether equal
accessibility and opportunity of individual children should be consid-
ered in the classroom.74
63. 121 CONG. REc. 19,483 (1975).
64. Rowley 458 U.S. at 212-218. (White, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540. (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 300 & 301).
67. Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons From Special Education
Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB L.J. 759, 760 (2001).
68. Autism is on the Rise, http://www.brighttots.com/autism-on-the-rise70604.html
(last visited, March 22, 2010).
69. Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 10 (2006).
70. What is Autism?, http://www.autismspeaks.org/whatisitindex.php?WT.svl=Top
Nay (last visited March 22, 2010).
71. CRAIG J. NEWSCHAFFER, The Epidemiology of Autism Spectrum Disorders, ANNuAL
REVIEW OF PUBLIc HEALTH, (Vol. 28, 2007).
72. What is Autism?, http://www.autismspeaks.org/whatisit/index.php?WT.svl=Top
Nay (last visited March 22, 2010).
73. Id.
74. See Megan Roberts, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Why
considering Individuals one at a time creates untenable situations for students and
educators, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. (2007-2008).
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IV. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DISQUIETUDE
A. Modern Approaches
President Barack Obama and the United States Congress have
recognized the swift urgency for policy changes regarding the issue of
autism. President Obama recently requested 211 million dollars as
part of the Department of Health and Human Services budget for ASD
research.77 The funds are to be appropriated toward research for
causes of ASD, developing new treatments, as well as additional
screening, support services, and efforts to raise public awareness.7 8
Due in part to pressure from Congress, funding for autism efforts has
risen from about $101 million in 2006 to $132 million in 2007, even in a
76. See office of Special Education and Rehab Services, Office of Special Education
Programs, U.S. Department of Education, Data Analysis System (DANS), 19762005, Table
1-3 (2006).
77. Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Science Insider: White House Requests New Funding for
Autism, http://blogs.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/02/white-house-req.html (last
visited April 4th, 2009).
78. Id.
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time of tight National Institute of Health budgets.7 9  President
Obama's 2010 budget proposal urges boosting funding more quickly
than originally planned-an earlier goal was to hit $210 million in
2011.80
Moreover, the Combating Autism Act 81 was signed into law by
former President George W. Bush on December 19th, 2006.82 This leg-
islation specifically authorizes nearly one billion dollars in
expenditures to combat Aspergers Syndrome, Rett Syndrome, Child-
hood Disintegrative Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder-
Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS), all of which fall under the broad
umbrella of Autism.83 This particular legislation supports screening,
education, early intervention, and prompt referrals for treatment, ser-
vices and research. 84
Additionally, on April 2, 2009, U.S. Senator Richard Durbin of
Illinois introduced the Autism Treatment Acceleration Act.85 If
passed, this legislation will provide coverage for the diagnosis and
treatment of ASD, including coverage of Applied Behavioral Analysis
therapy, a medically-necessary, evidence-based autism treatment and
assistive communication devices.86
Finally, on, March 25th, 2009 U.S. Senator Robert Menendez of
New Jersey also introduced a bill entitled The Helping Hands for Au-
tism Act.8 7 If passed, this bill will increase Housing, Awareness, and
Navigation Demonstration Services (HANDS) for individuals with Au-
tism Spectrum Disorders. 88
The magnitude of this governmental response was not present,
nor was it needed, during the Rowley era. The pediatric prevalence
rate of ASD at that time was approximately one in every ten thousand
children.8 9 This stark numerical contrast between incident rates of the
1980's and 2009 clearly suggests that the rise of Autism Spectrum Dis-
order was unforeseeable and thus a non-factor when the Rowley
opinion was rendered.
79. Id. NEWS AND ANALYSIS FROM THE WORLD OF SCIENCE POLICY
80. Id.
81. Pub. L. No. 109-416, 120 U.S.C. § 2821 (2006).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. H.R. 2413, 111th Cong. (2009).
86. Id.
87. S. 706, 111th Cong. (2009).
88. Id.
89. See Causes of Autism, http://www.brighttots.com/autismontherise_70604.html
(last visited April 1, 2009).
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V. THE PARADOX AND PARADIGM OF APPLYING ROWLEY
Due to the shortcomings of the Education of the Handicapped
Act of 1970, Congress has had to refine legislation so as to remedy dis-
parity and discrimination of the disabled in public education. The
Education of the Handicapped Act was reauthorized as the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 2000.90 Subsequently, IDEA
was reauthorized again in 2004 as the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act.91
Against this backdrop emerges the contemporary case of
Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke. 92 This case initially began
over a dispute between the Thompson R2-J School District in Colorado
and the parents of a student with Autism Spectrum Disorder named
"Luke." Luke was a student at Berthoud Elementary School. 93 While
there, he was having trouble "generalizing" skills.9 4 "Generalization"
is a child's ability to take what is learned at school and successfully
implement the skills outside the confines of the classroom.9 5
A. Generalization and IEP's
In the fall of 2000, Luke began receiving special education ser-
vices in accordance with the provisions of IDEA.9 6 Central to IDEA is
the requirement that local school districts develop, implement, and an-
nually revise an Individualized Education Program (IEP) calculated to
meet the eligible student's specific educational needs.97 Luke's par-
ents, concerned about his lack of progress in class, were informed by an
outside professional, Diane Osaki that the school staff sometimes un-
knowingly reinforced negative behaviors that Luke's parents were
trying to desist.98 His parents subsequently called for an IEP meeting
on December 16th, 2003 and told the school they felt the goals in
Luke's Individualized Education Program were not attainable at
Berthoud Elementary.99 Furthermore, they felt that the only place-
90. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1474 (2000).
91. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (2005).
92. Thompson R2J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 2007 WL 1879981 (D. Colo. June 27, 2007).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Telephone Interview with Samantha Carbone, Speech Language Pathologist (Apr.
13, 2009).
96. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (2005).
97. Id. at 1414 (d).
98. Id.
99. Thompson R2J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 2007 WL 1879981 (D. Colo. June 27, 2007).
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ment for Luke would be a residential program tailored for autistic
children. 0 0 On December 19, 2003, counsel for Luke's family sent the
school district a letter stating that the family intended to remove Luke
from Berthoud Elementary, enroll him at BHS, and seek from the R2-J
School District financial reimbursement under the provisions of
IDEA.101 The school district immediately challenged, stating it was
their opinion that their own IEP would incorporate nearly all the goals
requested by the parents.102 They also called for Luke's continued
placement at Berthoud Elementary. 0 3 Pursuant to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act provisions, Luke's parents sought a
procedural due process hearing in the Colorado Department of Educa-
tion stating that the school district's Individual Education Plan failed
to provide Luke with a free and appropriate public education.104
After two subsequent hearings, both the impartial hearing of-
ficer and the administrative law judge agreed that Luke's residential
placement was necessary.105 In weighing their decision, they factored
in evidence of Luke becoming more violent at home as well as the fact
that his teachers were unknowingly reinforcing his negative
behavior.106
In response to these adverse decisions, the R2-J School District
initiated an action in the U.S. District Court for the 10th Circuit, seek-
ing reversal on the grounds that they were in compliance with all legal
requirements under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.' 0 7
The U.S. District Court for the 10th Circuit, however, ultimately
agreed with the administrative decisions regarding the need to place
Luke in a more appropriate school program compatible with Luke's
unique needs.' 0 8 Subsequently, the R2-J School District appealed.109
B. Two Issues and Two Reversals
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was tasked with answering
Rowley throughout their opinion; the court reexamined Luke's 2003 In-
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Supra note 99, at 4.
105. Thompson R2J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 2007 WL 1879981 (D. Colo. June 27, 2007) at
1.
106. Id.
107. Id. At 7.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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dividual Education Plan and stated that precedent dictated that "the
measure and adequacy of an IEP can only be determined as of the time
it is offered to the student."110 Essentially, this means that a school is
not legally held accountable based on a lack of academic progress of the
child. Furthermore, the opinion stated that their Circuit's precedent
dictated that "neither the statute nor reason countenance 'Monday
Morning Quarterbacking' in evaluating the appropriateness of a child's
placement."" In hindsight, the effectiveness of what was written as
a goal in an Individualized Education Plan was not reasonable in the
eyes of the court. Lastly, since the Court of Appeals concluded that
Luke's IEP was in fact "calculated" for him to receive "benefits," the
R2-J School District in Colorado was found to comply with the Individ-
uals with Disabilities Education Act's requirements.1 12
The second and final issue was whether Luke's failure to "gen-
eralize" from school to home was a significant factor to consider under
IDEA.113 Luke's parents argued that Luke's obtaining generalization
skills was fundamental to his progress and that without it their son
could never reach adult self-sufficiency. 114 To help answer the "gener-
alization" issue, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals again cited Rowley.
Its opinion on this issue was that the Supreme Court "expressly consid-
ered and rejected the notion that self-sufficiency is the substantive
standard which Congress imposed on the States."1 1 5 Judge Gorsuch's
opinion went even further and stated that "no educational value or
goal, including generalization, carries special weight under IDEA."116
Analyzed in its totality, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals proclaimed
that the "appropriateness" of Luke's education would not be based on
factors such as goals, values, nor generalization of skills from school to
home. Based on these findings, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.
C. Autism Speaks' Files a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Luke
On January 8th, 2009, Autism Speaks, acting as Amicus Curiae
for Luke, filed a writ of certiorari to petition the United States Su-
110. Thompson R2J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 2007 WL 1879981 (D. Colo. June 27, 2007) at
7.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Thompson R2J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 2007 WL 1879981 (D. Colo. June 27, 2007).
116. Id.
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preme Court to hear Luke's case.' 17 The main argument presented by
Autism Speaks was that a "benefit standard cannot hope to meaning-
fully address a pervasive developmental disorder any more than a
'band-aid' would be reasonably calculated to address the needs of some-
one badly injured in an automobile accident."118 On January 8th,
2009, the United States Supreme Court declined to hear the merits of
this argument.
VI. CONCLUSION
One constant over the course of American history is the Su-
preme Court's willingness to overturn bad precedent in a judicial
system based on a foundation of "stare decisis." The Supreme Court
has reestablished its lost credibility time and again by redressing un-
seemly precedent when necessity mandates change.119 In 2010, new
authority is needed so the courts can reconcile the illogical standard of
applying antiquated authority to contemporary autism cases. A blan-
ket application of Rowley creates the unusual judicial paradox of
shielding our schools, rather than protecting the children as Congress
intended. Our courts and society have an interest in protecting schools
from frivolous lawsuits, but the scope of that interest should not extend
to blanket exemption from meritorious actions when they fail. The
Rowley precedent and classroom disability legislation, in the final
analysis, are the laws of the forked tongue. On one side, public school
disability legislation was implemented to advance the interests of dis-
abled students. On the other side, however, the Rowley precedent has
rendered these same goals as nothing more than mere pretense.
Justice Antonin Scalia once wrote in an opinion, "[the value of
any rule must be assessed not only on the basis of what is gained, but
also on the basis of what is lost."12 0 R2-J School District v. Luke cap-
tures the essence of everything wrong in misapplying a judicial relic to
an unprecedented social epidemic. This obscure case, while now set-
tled for the R2-J School District, has devastating consequences for
Luke and his family. As a result of not receiving appropriate services
117. Brief for Amicus Curiae Autism Speaks, in Support of Luke P., P. v. Thompson R2-
J Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 1143 (2009).
118. Id. at 5.
119. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of
racial segregation even in public accommodations under the doctrine of "separate but
equal") and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S.483 1954) (declaring that state
laws that established separate public schools for black and white students denied black
children equal educational opportunities).
120. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 145, 161 (1990). (Scalia, A., dissenting).
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tailored to his needs, Luke will most likely will slip further and further
behind in school and thus in life. He case ultimately stands to symbol-
ize the growing amount of autism cases across our nation's
jurisdictions. While public schools are not to blame for Autism Spec-
trum Disorder, denying Luke and others similarly situated an
opportunity to receive an "appropriate education" to may inevitably
seal his young fate.
In 2010, many students diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Dis-
order are nowhere to be found on the broad highway of education
Judge Minor Wisdom wrote about so long ago. Instead, these children
and their parents are instead forced to travel along the demoralizing
crucible of judicial by-roads and winding trails that are full of sharp
thickets, pitfalls, and traps. Surely Judge Wisdom would dissent.

